Asterisk Open Source Remote Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
 
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Amazon PayFort payfort-php-SDK Multiple Cross Site Scripting Vulnerabilities
 

Posted by InfoSec News on Nov 15

https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Experts-Cyberattacks-Could-Threaten-Entire-Countries-Not-Just-Energy-Assets.html

By Tsvetana Paraskova
Oilprice.com
Nov 14, 2018

Cyber attacks have grown bolder and increasingly creative and some of them
target the shutting down of entire countries, not just disrupting oil and
gas assets or stealing identities, according to industry experts.

"At some point (hackers) were after a quick...
 

Posted by InfoSec News on Nov 15

https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/11/14/opm_hack_failure/

By Shaun Nichols
The Register
14 Nov 2018

More than three years after suffering one of the largest cyber-attacks in
US government history, the Office of Personnel Management has yet to adopt
dozens of the security measures investigators ordered - including basic
stuff like changing passwords.

A report issued this week by Government Accountability Office (GAO)
disclosed that the OPM...
 

Posted by InfoSec News on Nov 15

http://fortune.com/2018/11/14/dragos-raise-funding-venture-capital-energy-grid-security/

By Robert Hackett
Fortune.com
11/14/2018

Two years ago when Rob Lee first sought funding for his cybersecurity
startup Dragos, most venture capitalists didn't deem the business
"investible," he says.

The market for securing industrial control systems --machinery used in
manufacturing, water treatment, power plants, and oil and gas...
 

Posted by InfoSec News on Nov 15

https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-46206614

By Sajid Iqbal
Community affairs specialist
BBC.com
11/04/2018

The two men are accused of being members of a 36-strong group said to have
been behind a dark web forum responsible for more than $530m (£409m) of
losses to banks and individuals.

The Infraud Organisation is said to have sold stolen credit cards and IDs.

Taimoor Zaman and Anthony Nnamdi Okeakpu deny the allegations made against...
 

Posted by InfoSec News on Nov 15

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/retail/security-breach-at-nordstrom-exposed-sensitive-employee-data/

By Benjamin Romano
Seattle Times business reporter
November 9, 2018
Updated November 11, 2018

Seattle-based retailer Nordstrom is notifying employees of an
information-security breach that exposed their names, Social Security
numbers, dates of birth, checking account and routing numbers, salaries
and more.

Employees across the company...
 

Introduction

Emotet malware is distributed through malicious spam (malspam), and its active nearly every day--at least every weekday.  Sometimes the criminals behind Emotet take a break, such as a one month-long hiatus from early October through early November, but the infrastructure pushing Emotet has been very active since Monday 2018-11-05.

As Symantec and others have reported, the group behind Emotet has evolved from maintaining its own banking Trojan, and it now also distributes malware for other groups.  I commonly see follow-up malware like Trickbot and Zeus Panda Banker during Emotet infections generated in my lab environment.


Shown above:  Chain of events for recent infections caused by Emotet malspam.

Today's diary examines an Emotet infection on Wednesday 2018-11-14 with the IcedID banking Tojan as its follow-up malware.

Details

A quick check of URLhaus showed me several URLs tagged emotet and heodo, which is another name for Emotet.  After you've seen enough of these URLs, you get a feel for their patterns and can identify an Emotet URL by looking at it.


Shown above:  Several Emotet URLs I saw on URLhaus.

Using a vulnerable Windows host, I picked an Emotet URL to download a Word document.  I opened the document, enabled macros, and saw the expected infection traffic.


Shown above:  Example of a Word document downloaded from an Emotet URL.


Shown above:  Traffic from an infected Windows host filtered in Wireshark.

Forensics on the infected Windows host

After reviewing the infection traffic, I checked my infected Windows host for malware.  Malware binaries for both Emotet and the IcedID banking Trojan were in the same places I've seen them before.


Shown above:  Emotet persistent on my infected Windows host.


Shown above:  IcedID persistent on my infected Windows host.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Malware from my infected Windows host:

SHA256 hash: 045e15c1df7c712dcac94c720b81df08fd0ff4e4c177d231d5cdcd7b4d096f95

  • File size: 94,592 bytes
  • File name: form-363439590633444.doc (random file names depending on the download URL)
  • File description: Downloaded Word doc with macro for Emotet

SHA256 hash: d6dd56e7fb1cc71fc37199b60461e657726c3bf8319ce59177ab4be6ed3b9fb4

  • File size: 430,080 bytes
  • File location: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\[random name].exe
  • File description: Emotet malware binary on the infected Windows host

SHA256 hash: 667cda76b582c0771f85ad12167238e0f4bb12f479030d99c8a15d7f08eb9975

  • File size: 421,888 bytes
  • File location: C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\[random name].exe
  • File description: updated Emotet malware binary on the infected Windows host

SHA256 hash: cb04718694115b94b4d8bde2be0a4daf802c7a4c94f9b81811872e4e7126e813

  • File size: 424,960 bytes
  • File location: C:\ProgramData\OFyKiE6aak4yfFf.exe
  • File description: IcedID banking Trojan retrieved by Emotet

SHA256 hash: 63e348c05cd94f4488f7f1707ba901ddfa8ec04b4626a46ae2d9d0a83ae291ae

  • File size: 424,960 bytes
  • File location: C:\ProgramData\{3B5AAD3D-DD3D-452D-B98C-9F29F9D9C0D3}\czvgbwww.exe
  • File description: IcedID banking Trojan persistent on the infected Windows host

Traffic from my infected Windows host:

Traffic that returned the initial Word document:

  • 78.135.65.15 port 80 - bysound.com.tr - GET /En_us/Documents/11_18/

Traffic that returned the Emotet malware binary:

  • 50.62.194.30 port 80 - c-t.com.au - GET /PspAMbuSd2
  • 50.62.194.30 port 80 - c-t.com.au - GET /PspAMbuSd2/

Post-infection traffic caused by Emotet:

  • 5.9.128.163 port 8080 - Attempted TCP connections, no response from the server
  • 12.222.134.10 port 7080 - Attempted TCP connections, no response from the server
  • 23.254.203.51 port 8080 - Attempted TCP connections, no response from the server
  • 24.201.79.34 port 8080 - 24.201.79.34:8080 - GET /
  • 37.120.175.15 port 80 - Attempted TCP connections, no response from the server
  • 49.212.135.76 port 443 - 49.212.135.76:443 - GET /
  • 50.78.167.65 port 7080 - 50.78.167.65:7080 - GET /
  • 69.198.17.20 port 8080 - Attempted TCP connections, no response from the server
  • 71.163.171.106 port 80 - 71.163.171.106 - GET /
  • 71.58.165.119 port 443 - 71.58.165.119:443 - GET /
  • 71.58.165.119 port 443 - 71.58.165.119:443 - GET /whoami.php
  • 76.65.158.121 port 50000 - 76.65.158.121:50000 - GET /
  • 81.86.197.52 port 8443 - 81.86.197.52:8443 - GET /
  • 86.12.247.149 port 80 - Attempted TCP connections, no response from the server
  • 109.170.209.165 port 8080 - 109.170.209.165:8080 - GET /
  • 133.242.208.183 port 8080 - 133.242.208.183:8080 - GET /
  • 138.207.150.46 port 443 - 138.207.150.46:443 - GET /
  • 139.59.242.76 port 8080 - Attempted TCP connections, no response from the server
  • 159.65.76.245 port 443 - Attempted TCP connections, no response from the server
  • 160.36.66.221 port 990 - 160.36.66.221:990 - GET /
  • 165.227.213.173 port 8080 - Attempted TCP connections, no response from the server
  • 173.11.47.169 port 8080 - 173.11.47.169:8080 - GET /
  • 173.19.73.104 port 443 - Attempted TCP connections, no response from the server
  • 173.160.205.161 port 990 - 173.160.205.161:990 - GET /
  • 173.160.205.162 port 443 - 173.160.205.162:443 - GET /
  • 177.242.156.119 port 80 - Attempted TCP connections, no response from the server
  • 186.18.236.83 port 8080 - 186.18.236.83:8080 - GET /
  • 189.134.18.141 port 443 - Attempted TCP connections, no response from the server
  • 189.244.86.184 port 990 - 189.244.86.184:990 - GET /
  • 192.155.90.90 port 7080 - Attempted TCP connections, no response from the server
  • 198.199.185.25 port 443 - Attempted TCP connections, no response from the server
  • 200.127.55.5 port 80 - 200.127.55.5 - GET /
  • 205.185.187.190 port 80 - 205.185.187.190 - GET /
  • 210.2.86.72 port 8080 - 210.2.86.72:8080 - GET /
  • 210.2.86.94 port 8080 - Attempted TCP connections, no response from the server

Post-infection traffic caused by the IcedID banking Trojan:

  • 185.129.49.19 port 443 - therebes.biz - SSL/TLS traffic caused by IcedID
  • 185.129.49.19 port 80 - freshwallet.at - GET /data2.php?0123456789ABCDEF (different hex characters depending on the infected host)

Final words

Both Emotet and IcedID have remained fairly consistent in their behavioral patterns, so nothing here is unusual.  This diary is yet another reminder the criminals behind Emotet remain active, and they continue to push follow-up malware like the IcedID banking Trojan.

A pcap of the infection traffic and the associated malware from today's diary can be found here.

---
Brad Duncan
brad [at] malware-traffic-analysis.net

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
 
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
 
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